Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of
Respondeat Superior
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code,' as recently
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services,2 allows municipalities to be held liable for-certain
violations of constitutional rights committed by their officers. In so
construing the statute, the Court overruled those portions of its
earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape3 holding that municipalities cannot constitute "persons" under section 1983. The Monell Court,
however, stopped short of concluding that municipalities should be
held liable for all constitutional violations committed by their
officers; it indicated instead that liability should be imposed on
municipalities only for violations effected pursuant to "official
policy,"' and declared that the doctrine of respondeat superior5 is
inapplicable to section 1983 suits against municipalities.
Although the rejection of municipal respondeat superior is
likely to become one of the most frequently cited aspects of Monell,I
the Court's discussion of the outer bounds of municipal liability is
in no way essential to the Monell holding. Since the case involved
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
436 U.S. at 694.
1 The doctrine allows one party to be held liable for another's actions under certain
circumstances; the term is generally used, as it is in this comment, to describe its "most
familiar illustration . . the liability of a master for the torts of his servant in the course of
his employment." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 458 (4th ed. 1971).
See RFSTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
A servant is broadly defined as "a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
subject to the other's control or right to control." RESTATEMENT, supra, § 220(1). See W.
PROSSER, supra, § 70, at 460. The modem view is that the employer may be held liable even
for the employee's intentional torts, so long as they were committed in the course of the
servant's employment. Id. at 464-67. On the "scope of employment" requirement, see
RESTATEMENT, supra, §§ 228-237; on the requirement that the employer have "control" over
the employee's actions, see id. § 220 & Comment d; W. PROSSER, supra, § 70, at 460.
1 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 336-37 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3189 (Oct. 2, 1979) (No. 78-1779); Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d
622, 624-25 (6th Cir. 1978); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 677-78 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 320 n.52 (1978).
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a formal municipal policy,' the respondeat superior analysis is, as
Justice Stevens noted, "merely advisory."" It therefore seems appropriate to consider at length the proper standard for municipal liability-that is, which actions of which municipal employees can result
in governmental liability-before Monell's dictum becomes accepted doctrine.
This comment examines the propriety of municipal respondeat
superior liability.' First, it analyzes the reasons offered by the
Monell Court for rejecting respondeat superior in section 1983 actions against municipalities. Then, the comment argues that the
purposes and legislative history of the provision demand a scheme
of respondeat superior liability. Finally, the comment explores the
countervailing concerns of federalism, and considers their impact on
such a liability scheme.

I. Monell: OFFicAL MUNCnIAL POLICY
In Monell, the plaintiffs, female employees of the New York
City Department of Social Services and Board of Education, were
forced to take unpaid pregnancy leaves before such leaves were medically necessary.10 Contending that the policy was unconstitutional,
the employees brought a section 1983 action seeking back pay"
I See text and note at note 10 infra. See also 436 U.S. at 694 ("this case unquestionably
involves official policy as the moving force").
8 436 U.S. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence
for the sole purpose of noting that this and other portions of the opinion were "not necessary
to explain the Court's decision."
The Monel Court expressly left open the question whether municipalities should be
awarded any form of immunity under section 1983, though it did indicate that granting an
absolute immunity would be inappropriate. Id. at 701. In the analogous area of immunity for
executive officials, the Court developed a limited "good faith" defense by relying both on
policy arguments-principally, that fear of personal liability would inhibit state officials from
taking necessary actions, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42, 246 (1974)-and on the strong common-law background of
executive immunity against which section 1983 was passed, see note 21 infra. Neither of these
factors supports the principle of limiting municipal liability however, since making a municipality liable will not undesirably inhibit individual action, and since at the time section 1983
was passed there was no strong common-law tradition of municipal immunity, see text and
notes at notes 95-100 infra. This comment will not, however, address the proper scope of
municipal immunity. That issue should be resolved shortly when the Court reviews Owen
v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. granted,48 U.S.L.W. 3189 (Oct.
2, 1979) (No. 78-1779)-in which the issue is directly presented.
10 436 U.S. at 660-61, 661 n.2.
" The plaintiffs also sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 661. The trial court,
although noting that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights had been violated, 394 F. Supp. 853,
855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), denied
the claims because of mootness: the city had changed its policies relating to maternity leaves.
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against the Department and its Commissioner, the Board and its
Chancellor, and the city of New York. The relief was denied by the
lower courts because the damages would ultimately be paid by the
city,' 2 which under Monroe v. Pape was not a "person" for purposes
of section 1983. The Monell Court, however, after a searching discussion of section 1983's legislative history, overruled Monroe's
3
holding that municipalities could not be liable under the statute.'
In the course of this analysis, the Court, speaking through Justice
Brennan, articulated the new standard of municipal liability under
section 1983:
[I]t is when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.'1
12

394 F. Supp. at 855.

436 U.S. at 669. The Court felt compelled to reconsider Monroe v. Pape because its
holding was perceived as inconsistent with an uninterrupted series of Supreme Court cases,
beginning with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which had allowed section 1983
actions against school boards. 436 U.S. at 696. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 636 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
Because the claim denied by the Court in Monroe v. Pape was actually based on respondeat superior, it has been argued that the broad rationale advanced in that case-that
municipalities are not "persons" under the statute-should be disregarded; Monroe and its
progeny would therefore be read only as rejecting municipal vicarious liability. See, e.g.,
Levin, The Section 1983 MunicipalImmunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1977). Cf. Monell,
436 U.S. at 663 n.7 (Monroe upheld "insofar as it holds that the doctrine of respondeat
superior is not a basis for rendering municipalities liable"). Under such an analysis, Monell
would be a clarification rather than an overruling of Monroe. This approach seems to be at
the heart of Justice Powell's concurrence, see id. at 704-14 (Powell, J., concurring), for he
suggested that by rejecting respondeat superior, the Court avoided having to overrule any of
its prior decisions. Id. at 707, 708-13 (Powell, J., concurring).
On closer scrutiny, however, this approach seems incorrect. To argue that Monroe did
not bar all section 1983 actions against municipalities would require accepting the Court's
result while rejecting entirely its reasoning. And even if Monroe is given such a strained
interpretation, Monell would still require overruling a Supreme Court decision: in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), the Court applied the Monroe rationale to hold that
a municipal ordinance could not be challenged under section 1983.
Justice Powell sought to downplay the stare decisis implications of overturning City of
Kenosha by arguing that, since the issue of municipal immunity was raised by the Court in
that case, the holding was owed "somewhat less [than usual] deference." 436 U.S. at 709
n.6 (Powell, J., concurring). That, however, does not seem to reduce significantly the precedential impact of the holding. See id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing landmark
cases in which issues were raised by the Court). And, given the nearly universal interpretation of Monroe as barring absolutely suits against local governments, see, e.g., The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, supra note 6, at 312 n.7, it seems pointless to try to distinguish that case
from Monell at this late date.
" 436 U.S. at 694.
'3
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The Court's conclusion that respondeat superior is not a permissible basis for section 1983 municipal liability was based on
analyses of the statutory language, the legislative history, and a
prior interpretation of the provision. 5 Justice Brennan relied principally on both the absence of any explicit mention of respondeat
superior in section 1983,16 and Congress's rejection of the Sherman amendment,17 a companion act to section 1983, one version of
which would have imposed an extreme form of vicarious liability on
municipalities. On closer scrutiny, however, the inferences the
Court drew from these sources are open to serious question; if anything, the legislative history and prior interpretations of section
1983 seem to support a scheme of municipal respondeat superior
liability.
A.

The Language of Section 1983

Section 1983, as originally enacted, created liability for "any
person who, under color of any . . .statute . . .shall subject, or
cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution."' The
Monell Court, focusing on the "subject, or cause to be subjected"
language, concluded that Congress meant to foreclose all forms of
vicarious liability. Justice Brennan made two points based on the
language of the statute. First, he noted that section 1983 "cannot
be easily read" to impose vicarious liability. 9 Presumably, he meant
that by explicitly imposing liability on the violator through the
"shall subject" phrase, Congress meant implicitly to foreclose vicarious liability. The Court, apparently applying the principle of
expressio unius exclusio alterius, then stated that "the fact that
Congress did specifically provide that A's tort became B's liability
if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress
did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was
absent.""
The Court's conclusions, however, seem strained. Its interpretation is essentially one from silence: since the statute makes liable
those who "subject, or cause to be subjected," the Court concluded
"Id. at 691-94.
" Id. at 691-92.
'T Id. at 692 n.57, 693-94.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976)) (emphasis added).
11436 U.S. at 692.
20

Id. (footnote omitted).
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that only those directly responsible for a constitutional tort can be
found to violate the provision. Yet in the context of section 1983, the
legislative silence seems to cut the other way. As the Court stated
in Monroe v. Pape, the section should be "read against the background of tort liability,""' and part of that common-law background
is the idea that corporate bodies-both private and municipal 22-may be made liable through respondeat superior.? Since the
Reconstruction Congress apparently passed the legislation with tort
concepts in mind, a separate respondeat superior provision would
have been unnecessary; just as courts have concluded that Congress
meant to incorporate into section 1983 such common-law doctrines
as proximate cause 4 and official immunity'--concepts as to which
the statute is silent-so respondeat superior could have been intended though unmentioned. Direct and vicarious liability coexisted at common law; Congressmen in 1871 would thus likely have
expected a simple declaration of employer liability to embrace
rather than exclude respondeat superior. And this seems in fact to
have been the congressional intent behind the statute's unadorned
language. Senator Thurman, for example, suggested that the statute's silence would not be construed as limiting its scope: rather,
"there is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed [in section 1983], and they are as comprehensive as can be
used.""
21 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). Accord, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 n.13 (1978); Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) ("§ 1983 is to be read in harmony with general
principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them"); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964); Note, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI.L. REv.
494, 507-08 (1970).
The Supreme Court, to avoid impairing the effectiveness of section 1983, has not, however, hesitated to disregard or temper common-law tort principles in construing an otherwise
silent statute. For instance, the executive immunity ordered by the common law has been
qualified under section 1983 by conditioning protection from liability on good faith. See Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
'2 On the application at common law of respondeat superior principles to municipalities,
see text and notes at notes 95-100 infra.
2 See note 5 supra.Indeed, it is difficult to read any broad significance into the statute's
causation language, "[b]ecause the word 'causes' is not a term of art that necessarily precludes vicarious liability." Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1213 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2USee, e.g., Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1972). For a criticism of
the court's use of proximate cause, see Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort
Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 23-25 (1974).
15See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-19 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554-57 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
2,CONG. GLoaS, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 216-17 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Thurman),
quoted in Monell, 436 U.S. at 685 n.45 (emphasis omitted). Senator Thurman was an oppo-
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The Court also disregarded another aspect of the statute's
common-law tort background: in the nineteenth century, the doctrine of respondeat superior was based, at least in part, on the
fiction that "he who acts through another, acts himself."2 Whether
it was the master or his servant who physically committed the tort,
the master was legally regarded as the "person" who caused the
harm. Indeed, in some jurisdictions one could state a cause of action
by pleading the acts of the agent as the acts of the principal .28 Given
the prevailing fiction that the act of the employee was the act of the
employer, the fact that Congress provided liability only for any
"person" who "shall subject, or cause to be subjected," need not be
read to exclude respondeat superior.
Finally, the Court's linguistic analysis is theoretically as well
as historically flawed. The Monell Court rejected respondeat superior by concluding that if an employee "caused" a tort, the
"municipality" did not cause it. Such an analysis requires, however,
that there be a sharp dichotomy between municipal action on the
one hand, and the actions of a municipality's lower-level employees
on the other. But since all municipal action is necessarily vicarious-a municipality acts only through its agents 2"-the courts have
been unable to determine in any principled manner just what it is
nent of section 1983. For similar statements by supporters of the statute, see the citations to
the congressional debates in Monell, 436 U.S. at 685 n.45. See also text and notes at notes
76-77 infra.
2 Qui facit per alium facit per se. See, e.g., New Orleans, J. & Great N.R.R. v. Bailey,
40 Miss. 395, 452-53 (1866) ("the act of the agent is the act of the principal himself. . . an
incident which the law has wisely attached to the relation, from its earliest history"); Laugher
v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547, 553, 108 Eng. Rep. 204, 207 (K.B. 1826) (master liable for acts "of
those whom the law denominates his servants, because such servants represent the master
himself, and their acts stand upon the same footing as his own"); 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTAmES *432 ("wrong done by the servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the
master himself").
IsSee, e.g., Bennett v. Judson, 21 N.Y. 238, 239-40 (1860) ("The same rule of law which
imputes to the principal the fraud of the agent, and makes him answerable for the consequences, justifies the allegation in pleading, that the principal himself committed the
wrong"); Holmes, Agency (pt. 2), 5 HAiv. L. REv. 20 (1892). See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 440, at 502-03, § 453b, at 527 (9th ed. Boston 1882)(lst ed. Boston
1839).
" See Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 164 (2d Cir.) (en banc) ("a municipality, of course,
can only act through its agents"), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v.
Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978) (for reconsideration in light of Monell); Adekalu v. New York
City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("All municipal liability is, in a sense, 'vicarious,'
and thus the concept of 'vicariousness' alone-to the extent that it refers merely to whether
the municipality acted in its own name or not-is not useful"); Collum v. Yurkovitch, 409 F.
Supp. 557, 559 (N.D. ll. 1975); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D. 111. 1975);
Schnapper, Civil Rights LitigationAfter Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213, 217 (1979).
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that makes the "municipality itself" responsible for some actions
and not for others."
A more straightforward reading of the statutory language suggests. that it encompasses the essential element of tort liability-causation, either direct ("shall subject") or indirect ("cause to
be subjected")-coupled with state action and constitutional harm
requirements. A requirement of causation is perfectly compatible
with vicarious liability; indeed, at common law causation is required in actions based on respondeat superior, since the employer
is liable only for harm caused by an employee acting within the
scope of his employment.3 1 And the Supreme Court's own opinions
in section 1983 cases seem to interpret the statute as establishing
32
the essential element of tort liability and nothing more.
3 Several courts have attempted, in the context of actions brought against municipalities both under section 1983 and directly under the Constitution, to define municipal action.
One court suggested that action is official when the body responsible for it was "authorized
by the municipality to make such decisions." Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 617 n.9 (4th Cir.
1978). This, however, fails to explain why the municipality cannot be held liable for the
actions of its employees, all of whom have presumably been authorized to do their jobs. It
also fails to explain who can issue such authorizations on the municipality's behalf. Another
court suggested that the employees who can make a municipality liable are those "high
elected or appointed officials, chosen directly or indirectly by the people," who hold "such
high municipal office that they can reasonably be held to reflect municipal policy."
Adekalu v. New York City, 431 F. Supp. 812, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (action brought directly
under the Constitution). But this definition is circular: a "high" official is one who can
act for the municipality. That these courts have had such difficulty in defining municipal
action is not surprising, since there has also been confusion over whether municipal liability-under either section 1983 or the Constitution-is predicated on the municipality's having
committed the constitutional wrong, or on its having negligently failed to supervise the
employee. Compare Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 165 n.37 (2d Cir.) (en banc) ("The
municipality . . . has itself committed a wrong distinct from that of its employee-agent"),
vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978) (for
reconsideration in light of Monell) with Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 337 (8th
Cir. 1978) (harm committed by municipality itself), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3189 (Oct. 2,
1979) (No. 78-1779). Consequently, the courts have reached disparate results. Compare Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 168 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (actions of the local board of police
commissioners held to give rise to cause of action against municipality, directly under the
Constitution), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974
(1978) (for reconsideration in light of Monel) with McDonald v. Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir.) (county not held liable for actions of superintendent of county department of corrections), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
11See W. PRossER, supra note 5, § 69, at 458 ("The foundation of the action is still
negligence, or other fault, on the part of [the employee].").
32For example, while there is no language granting any form of immunity in section 1983,
the Court has in effect added common-law immunity doctrines to the statute. See, e.g.,
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("there is no language
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 extending any immunity to state officials" but "there are certain absolute
immunities so firmly rooted in the common law and supported by such strong policy reasons
that the Court has been unwilling to infer that Congress meant to abolish them").
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The Monell Court's reliance on the statutory language thus
seems misplaced. It is true, of course, that as a general matter the
words of a statute are the starting point in statutory construction.
But the language of section 1983 is extraordinarily broad and
general. It is for that reason that the courts, almost without
exception, have viewed the provision against the legislative and
common-law background. Monell's analysis of the statutory
language, however, failed to take this into account.
B.

The Sherman Amendment

The majority in Monell believed that, even apart from the language of section 1983, the legislative history of the provision demonstrated that Congress did not intend respondeat superior to form a
basis for section 1983 municipal liability. The Court's position was
based on Congress's rejection of the Sherman amendment, 33 a proposed addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 31 But given the essential differences between the Sherman amendment and respondeat
superior liability, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about
the congressional view of vicarious liability from the amendment's
5
rejection.1
3 Senator Sherman offered his amendment as a separate section to be added to the end
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
1986 (1976)). Monell, 436 U.S. at 666 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)).
Section one of the Act, which was passed with little debate, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 665,
became what is now section 1983. As originally proposed, the Sherman amendment would
have held the individual citizens of each county, city, or parish liable for any constitutional
violations that took place within the borders of that political subdivision. The amendment
passed in the Senate by a vote of 39 to 25 but was rejected by the House. See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. at 188-90 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663, 704-05, 725, 749, 800-01
(1871)).
The amendment was therefore referred to a conference committee. The committee's first
proposal, which was at the center of most of the Sherman amendment debates, was again
passed by the Senate but rejected by the House. It was more limited than the original version:
it placed liability for damages directly on the municipality, rather than on the individual
citizens, but only to the extent that the plaintiff's claim could not be satisfied by the individual responsible. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666-67 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749,
755 (1871)).
The second conference substitute, which eliminated any reference to liability on the part
of either innocent citizens or the municipality, was enacted as section six of the 1871 Act and
is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976). Monell, 436 U.S. at 668-69 (citing CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871)).
3' Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
1986 (1976)).
1 See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 161 (2d Cir.) (en banc) ("it is difficult to
draw any reasoned conclusion regarding Congress's attitude toward municipal liability for the
constitutional torts of public employees from the fate of the Sherman amendment") (footnote omitted), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974
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The Sherman amendment was, like section 1983, aimed at controlling the systematic abuse of rights in the post-Civil War South
by the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups. 3 Although both provisions
were drafted upon the belief that constitutional violations were37
being tolerated by local governments and private citizens alike,
their solutions were radically different. Section 1983 imposes liability on those responsible for the constitutional deprivation; the Sherman amendment, on the other hand, would have made municipalities strictly liable for all constitutional violations-whether committed by employees, citizens, or outsiders-that took place within
their boundaries.Y By imposing a form of collective liability, the
amendment's supporters hoped to enlist the entire population in an
effort to keep the peace. 9 At the same time, the amendment would
have insured compensation for all victims of constitutional violations.
Based on Congress's rejection of the Sherman amendment, the
Monell Court made two closely related points to demonstrate that
(1978) (for reconsideration in light of Monell); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1191-92 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments];
Comment, Toward State and MunicipalLiabilityin Damagesfor Denialof RacialProtection,
57 CALuF. L. REV. 1142 (1969); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalitiesfor Constitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 922, 945-48 (1976).
"' The Act of 1871 is, indeed, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. See.The Supreme Court,
1977 Term, supra note 6, at 311 n.2. Sections two, three, and four of the Act, defining certain
federal crimes and providing for presidential mobilization of the militia and suspension of
habeas corpus, were "aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan." Monell, 436 U.S. at 665 n.11.
The first section of the Act-now section 1983- did, however, give a remedy to whites as well
as blacks and therefore "went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections of the 1871
Act were addressed." Id. at 683.
'I Congressmen were apparently outraged both by repeated Klan excesses and by state
inaction in the face of organized private violence. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76
(1961); S. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871) (describing the violence for which the Klan
was responsible); CONG. GLOBz, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 153-57 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman)
(concern over Klan violence); id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey) (courts refuse to uphold
rights impartially); Developments, supra note 35, at 1153-56.
u The sponsors of the amendment apparently intended liability to attach only when the
municipality was in some sense at fault. There is no such requirement in the language of the
amendment, however, and many Congressmen believed it to be more broadly applicable. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57 (citing CONG. GLOBE., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 751-52 (1871) (remarks
of Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 756 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 761 (remarks of Sen.
Sherman); id. at 771 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id. at 788 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at
791 (remarks of Rep. Willard)).
1, "Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if they will not
make the hue and cry and take the necessary steps to put down lawless violence in those
States their property will be holden responsible, and the effect will be most wholesome."
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 761 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). Accord, id. at 76061 (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id. at 794 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. at 751-52 (remarks of
Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 757 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds).
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respondeat superior was inconsistent with congressional intent.
First, the Court suggested that similar policies-deterrence and insurance-lie behind both respondeat superior and the Sherman
amendment, so that allowing respondeat superior liability would
give rise to the same constitutional objections that were raised by
the opponents of the amendment. 40 Second, the Court reasoned that
"Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability presented
to it"1 demonstrated congressional opposition to respondeat superior. Neither of these points is valid, however, for both involve a
historically unjustified and internally inconsistent reading of congressional motives.
1. Similar Constitutional Objections. The Court's conclusion
that respondeat superior would have engendered the same constitutional objections as the Sherman amendment seems to be incorrect
for two reasons. First, contrary to the Court's analysis, the underlying policies sought to be effectuated by the two schemes of liability
are significantly different. One goal of respondeat superior, that of
forcing the municipality to deter its employees from official
wrongdoing, is hardly identical with that of securing "'a more perfect police regulation' ",42 against the unconstitutional acts of citizens and outsiders, the aim of the Sherman amendment. And requiring the municipality to self-insure against the wrongs of the
agents it employs and controls for its benefit bears little relation
indeed to the "'mutual insurance' ",a against all wrongdoing proposed in the Sherman amendment.
Second, the congressional debates concerning the Sherman
amendment indicate that the constitutional concerns of most legis11436

U.S. at 693-94.
11Id. at 692 n.57.
42 Id. at 694 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 777 (1871) (remarks of Sen.
Frelinghuysen)). While the Monell Court equates this with the idea of cost-effective deterrence underlying respondeat superior liability, Senator Frelinghuysen's remark was apparently offered in a somewhat different context: he was referring to the new, affirmative obligation to provide police protection that the Sherman amendment imposed on municipalities.
There is, of course, a difference between requiring a municipality to minimize harm caused
by an existing police force acting within the scope of its employment, and requiring it to
create a police force to prevent harm caused by outsiders. On the constitutional ramifications
of this distinction, see text and notes at notes 49-50 infra.
3 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 792 (1871) (remarks
of Rep. Butler)). While Monell interprets Representative Butler's remarks as referring to selfinsurance, they actually refer to the universal insurance against all wrongdoing required by
the amendment. The meaning is made clear by the remarks of Representative Kelley: "[B]y
making the whole body of citizens insurers for the victims you will have a safeguard which
no police arrangement can make, one more effective than any other . . . . " CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 794 (1871) (Remarks of Rep. Kelley).
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lators had no relevance to the limited policies served by respondeat
superior liability. Perhaps the major objection to the amendment
raised in the House of Representatives, drawing upon the theory of
dual sovereignty enunciated in cases like Collector v. Day,'" was
that the federal government could not force political subdivisions of
the states to keep the peace or create police forces.15 Such an obligation would have been indirectly created by the Sherman amendment damages remedy. Thus Representative Blair said of the
amendment: "If [Congress] can say that [a municipality] shall
be liable for damages occurring from a riot . . . where [will] its
power . . . stop and what obligations . . . might [it] not lay upon
a municipality .
"...,,46
Sherman amendment opponents in the
Senate used the same theory to support a different argument. They
focused not on the establishment of the obligation but on the means
of enforcement: creation of an automatic lien on all the municipality's money and property. 47 This would, under the principle of
Collector v. Day, violate the Constitution's dual-sovereignty principle by threatening the integrity of municipal operations.",
These objections, however, have no implications for a scheme
that would hold municipalities liable only for the unconstitutional
actions of their employees. 4 Respondeat superior liability would not
4478 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). In Day, the Court held that the federal government could
not tax the salary of a state judicial officer because "the state is as sovereign and independent
as the general government." Id. at 127.
11See Monell, 436 U.S. at 673-75. Since municipalities were seen as agents of state
control, imposing affirmative duties on them would impede the states from pursuing their
legitimate activities.
" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871), cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at 675. See
also Monell, 436 U.S. at 673-74 n.30 (listing those Sherman amendment opponents who
agreed with Representative Blair's view).
,7See 436 U.S. at 673 n.30. See also id. at 706 (Powell, J., concurring).
4' Creating an automatic lien on all of the municipality's property would discourage
outsiders from trading with it, adversely affecting municipal operations. See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson). In contrast, no automatic
lien is imposed on all municipal property in suits under section 1983. It is true that some
Sherman amendment opponents argued that drawing any damages from municipal resources
would make it impossible for the government to function effectively, and would give the
federal government the power to destroy an essential state instrumentality. See, e.g., id. But
the willingness of the Monell Court to hold that a municipality constitutes a person under
section 1983 suggests that the Court did not believe this objection to be widely held by
Sherman amendment opponents.
11The Monell Court concluded that even under the theory of dual sovereignty there is
"no limit on the power of federal courts to enforce the Constitution against municipalities
that violated it." 436 U.S. at 680. Thus, unless the Reconstruction legislators interpreted the
theory differently, they would have viewed a scheme of respondeat superior liability as violative of dual sovereignty only if they believed that municipalities were in no sense responsible
for the acts of their employees-an unlikely proposition.
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force municipalities to create police forces or keep the peace, since
it imposes liability on the city only for the acts of those who are
already employees. And it cannot force the city to insure against
wrongs committed by private citizens, since respondeat superior
liability can attach only when the principal has control over-and
is thus responsible for-the agent's actions.5 " As for the integrity of
municipal corporations, the judgment imposed on a municipality
under section 1983 does not institute a lien on all of the municipality's property-and, at any rate, a section 1983 judgment can now
be entered under the rationale of Monell itself.
The other arguments raised in debate against the Sherman
amendment similarly fail to establish that Congress intended to
preclude section 1983 respondeat superior liability. Some opponents
of the amendment, for example, suggested that it was unconstitutional because it would make municipalities liable in federal court
when there was no state action involved,5' or when no constitutionally protected interest had been violated.5 2 Still others were convinced that the proposal would force citizens to pay for violations
5
over which neither they nor their elected officials had any control. 3
But unlike the Sherman amendment, section 1983 has a state action
requirement. And unlike the Sherman amendment, respondeat superior applies only when the municipality and its officers are in a
position to control directly the acts of municipal employees.
2. Rejection of Vicarious Liability. The Court's second rationale-that Congress rejected a scheme of private vicarious liability
and thus rejected vicarious liability generally 5 4-is too broad, for all
municipal action, even that of the "official" kind, is by definition
50See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 220(1). It is only when such control exists that the
policies behind respondeat superior are served: the employer pays for anticipated harms
caused by those working for his benefit. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, §§ 69-70.
5 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 788-89 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at 794
(remarks of Rep. Poland); id. at 822 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
52 See id. at 788-89 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at 822 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
See id. at 762 (remarks of Sen. Stevenson); id. at 771 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id.
at 777 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. at 788 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. at 791 (remarks
of Rep. Willard); id. at 798-99 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
11See text and note at note 41 supra. The Court also drew support for its analysis from
the fact that Congress ultimately passed a substitute for the Sherman amendment-now 42
U.S.C. section 1986, see note 33 supra-which imposes liability on those who were directly
at fault. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57. But that Congress adopted what is now section 1986 says
nothing about what was seen as objectionable in the Sherman amendment, and therefore
"its enactment in lieu of the Sherman amendment does not create an inference that Congress
had a policy-based objection to imposition of vicarious liability on municipalities." Baskin
v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1213 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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vicarious.5 5 Accepting the Court's argument would therefore support
a rejection of municipal liability altogether, but that of course is
contrary to the holding of Monell. Moreover, the fact that Congress
rejected an extreme form of vicarious liability-albeit the only explicit form of vicarious liability presented to it-provides little support for the Monell Court's rejection of respondeat superior; it is no
more persuasive than the argument that Congress's rejection of the
Sherman amendment's municipal-liability scheme justified the illconsidered municipal-immunity rule of Monroe v. Pape.5
Justice Brennan apparently recognized the tenuousness of the
link between the Sherman amendment and section 1983, conceding
that "[s]trictly speaking . . . the fact that Congress refused to
impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens
does not conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused
to impose vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees."5 7 And given the essential differences between the Sherman
amendment and section 1983 respondeat superior liability-as well
as the fact that the constitutional problems perceived in the first are
not present in the second-it is difficult to discern any basis for the
inference the Court drew from Congress's rejection of the amendment.
C.

The Prior Construction of Section 1983

To strengthen its conclusion that section 1983 liability requires
a more direct causal link than is afforded by respondeat superior,
the Monell Court cited Rizzo v. Goode,58 an earlier Supreme Court
opinion construing the statute. The Monell Court, however, seems
to have read more into Rizzo than is actually there. At the same
m See note 29 supra. Nineteenth-century courts were aware of the distinction between
private vicarious liability and respondeat superior. See, e.g., Prather v. City of Lexington,

52 Ky. (13 B. Monroe) 559, 560, 561 (1852) (municipality liable for actions of employees done
"in pursuance of a general authority to act for the corporation," but there is "no principle of

law, that subjects a municipal corporation to a responsibility for the safety of the property
within its territorial limits").
1' The Court in Monroe v. Pape, interpreting Representative Poland's statement that
"Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town
organizations," CONG. GLOwS, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Poland),
concluded that in rejecting the Sherman amendment Congress believed it had no constitu-

tional power to impose civil liability on municipalities. 365 U.S. at 190-91. The Monroe Court,
like the Monell Court, thus read too much into the rejection of the Sherman amendment.
The Monett Court concluded from a more extensive canvass of the Sherman amendment

debates, however, that "obligation" referred to "affirmative duty" rather than "civil liability." See Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, 678-80.
436 U.S. at 692 n.57.
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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time, the Court disregarded several independent lines of cases
strongly indicating that respondeat superior is not inconsistent with
section 1983.
1. Rizzo v. Goode. In Rizzo, the Court heard the appeal of two
section 1983 actions brought against several high-level Philadelphia
officials. 9 The plaintiffs alleged a "pervasive pattern of illegal and
unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers." 60 The lower
courts granted an injunction against the officers; 6' the Supreme
Court reversed. 2 Rizzo does not, however, support the proposition
that the prior construction of section 1983 is inconsistent with re3
spondeat superior.1
The suit in Rizzo was aimed not at the city of Philadelphia but
at high-level city officials. And while obtaining equitable relief
against a city officer in many ways has the same effect as obtaining
such relief against the city itself, the Court treated Rizzo as a suit
against individuals. The issue was framed as whether the named
defendants had a personal duty to eliminate police misconduct, and
were therefore personally at fault. 4 Thus, the Court held that since
"none of the petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of any
rights secured under the Constitution . . .this case presented no
occasion for the District Court to grant equitable relief againstpetitioners.""5
The Rizzo Court's refusal to impose section 1983 liability on
supervisors, however, is not inconsistent with respondeat superior
liability for municipalities. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, supervisory officials are never personally liable for the acts of
subordinates; 6 the doctrine applies only to employers.
19The mayor, city managing director, police commissioner, and two subordinate police
supervisors were named as defendants. Id. at 364 n.1.
Id. at 366.
"
Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability & Responsibility v.
Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542
(3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
12423 U.S. at 381.
1 The Rizzo Court did stress the need for a causal link. Id. at 370-71 ("The plain words
of the statute impose liability. . . only for conduct which 'subjects, or causes to be subjected'
the complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws."). Section
1983's causation requirement is not, however, inconsistent with the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See text and note at note 31 supra.
" 423 U.S. at 375-77.
Id. at 377 (emphasis added). Rizzo rested on two additional alternative holdings: (1)
the lack of a case or controversy, id. at 371-73, and (2) the federalism concerns raised by the
wide-ranging character of the requested equitable relief, id. at 377-80. For a discussion of the
federalism issues raised by respondeat superior, see text and notes at notes 114-157 infra.
,1Respondeat superior liability attaches only when the servant acts for the benefit of the
master. See, e.g., 1 E. JAGGARD, HAND-BooK OF THE LAW oF ToiRS § 83(b), at 252-53 (1895);

1979]

Section 1983 and Respondeat Superior

2. The ContraryLines of Cases. The Monell Court, apart from
placing unfounded reliance on Rizzo, ignored several lines of cases
imposing vicarious liability in section 1983 actions. First, private
corporations acting under color of state law had been held liable
under the statute on the basis of respondeat superior." Second,
the District of Columbia Circuit had concluded that respondeat
superior is appropriate in section 1983 suits brought against the
W. PRosssR, supra note 5, § 70, at 461-63. Since a supervisor does not personally benefit from
the acts of his subordinate, respondeat superior is inapplicable. See, e.g., Jennings v. Davis,
476 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973) (section 1983 suit against supervisor) ("[Tihe 'master'
* . . is and can only be the municipality employing the appellees. It is the city who set the
enterprise in motion, who 'profits' from appellees' labor and who, if held liable in such
instances, can by its powers of taxation spread the resulting expenditures amongst the community at large.") (footnote omitted); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 370 n.39 (D.C. Cir.
1971) ("A superior officer is not subject to vicarious liability for the torts of his subordinate
* . . because they are both servants of the same employer") (citation omitted), rev'd in part
on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Milburn v.
Girard, 429 F. Supp. 865, 867 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Wilkerson v. Mock, 403 F. Supp. 971, 973-74
(E.D. Pa. 1975); People v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. 2d 409, 108 P.2d 923,
925 (1941).
" E.g., Croy v. Skinner, 410 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp.
185 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Private corporations may be defendants in section 1983 suits because
corporations and their employees can, under certain circumstances, operate under color of
state law. See Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 186-87 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (surety company); DeCarlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (detective company clothed
with statutory authority). But see Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966) ("test
[under color of law] can rarely be satisfied in the case of anyone other than a state official");
Warren v. Cummings, 303 F. Supp. 803 (D. Colo. 1969); Weyandt v. Mason's Stores, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
In Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a Pennsylvania district court denied a
motion to dismiss a section 1983 complaint against the defendant surety company after
holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior was "impliedly a part of the Civil Rights
Act." Id. at 189. The court reasoned that although section 1983 was predicated on notions of
blameworthiness-at least as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Monroe-respondeat superior was not precluded; both doctrines, the court observed, "co-exist harmoniously at
common law." Id. at 188. The court concluded that respondeat superior should be applied in
section 1983 actions so as to furnish "a 'deep pocket' from which a claimant can collect." Id.
Several pre-Monell decisions did, however, reject the use of respondeat superior against
private employers in section 1983 claims. E.g., Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc., 504 F.2d 142
(10th Cir. 1974); Weiss v. J.C. Penny Co., 414 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Draegerruled out
respondeat superior after improperly relying on a line of cases, Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d
1271 (8th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Ashenhurst v. Carey, 355
F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Barnes v. Dorsey, 354 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Boyden
v. Troken, 352 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Ill. 1973), that involved claims of vicarious liability against
superior officials for the acts of subordinates. 504 F.2d at 145. These cases are not inconsistent
with an application of respondeat superior to section 1983 claims against municipalities. See
text and note at note 66 supra. Nor did Weiss v. J.C. Penney Co., 414 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Ill.
1976), provide a principled basis for rejecting respondeat superior in the nonmunicipality
context. It relied on both the unsupporting precedent of Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th
Cir. 1971), one of the superior-official cases cited in Draeger, and Draeger. 414 F. Supp. at
53.
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District. 8 Third, many courts, using state law, had imposed vicarious liability under the authority of section 19889 in actions brought
under section 1983.10 Section 1988 permits state law to be used in
civil rights suits-but only when that law is consistent with the
language and purposes of the civil rights statute. These courts must
therefore have implicitly considered vicarious liability to be consistent with the words of section 1983. In addition, respondeat superior
liability had been imposed by the Third Circuit 7' in an action
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 7 2-a statute similarly
73
silent as to vicarious liability.
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd in part on other grounds
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court held that section 1983 does not apply in the District. Id. at 429-32. The
Supreme Court consequently did not consider the propriety of section 1983 respondeat superior liability.
In the lower court opinion, then-Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that Monroe did not
preclude the section 1983 claims against the District; the court then held the District liable
under the statute on the basis of respondeat superior. In finding the doctrine applicable, Chief
Judge Bazelon properly noted that those courts that have "suggested that there can be no
vicarious liability under § 1983," have really based their decisions on the notion that "a
superior officer is not subject to vicarious liability for the torts of his subordinate. . . because
they are both servants of the same employer." Id. at 370 n.39 (citations omitted).
69 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976)) (state law applicable to actions brought under Civil Rights statutes when consistent).
11E.g., Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440
F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1955).
' Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). In
Mahone, the city of Pittsburgh was held liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 for the racially
motivated misconduct of its employees. The court pointed to differences between sections
1981 and 1983 to avoid the Monroe v. Pope municipal-immunity rule. But the court's analysis
is nonetheless relevant to section 1983, because both provisions were passed while the "dual
sovereignty" theory of federalism was in vogue. See text and notes at notes 44-48 supra.
Although basing the city's section 1981 liability on respondeat superior, see 564 F.2d at 1021,
the court never discussed the question whether section 1981 demanded application of such a
doctrine.
72 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976)).
11 In at least one line of cases-involving suits brought against municipalities directly
under the fourteenth amendment-many courts have rejected municipal respondeat superior.
Such suits are based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which held that in the absence of special factors counselling hesitation, a remedy for official misconduct can be fashioned directly from the Constitution
Id. at 396. Although the Supreme Court before Monett neither approved nor disapproved the
use of such actions against municipalities, in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 514
(1973), it remanded such a claim to see if $10,000-the minimum amount for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331-was in controversy. See Note, Damage Remedies Against
Municipalitiesfor ConstitutionalViolations, supra note 35, at 929-30. Fourteenth amendment
actions against municipalities have since been accepted in most circuits. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 807 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (reviewing the decisions
of each circuit), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979); Comment, MunicipalLiabilityfor Constitutional
Violations: Can You Fight City Hall?, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 373 (1978).
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Obviously, none of these lower court cases compel the Supreme
Court to adopt section 1983 municipal respondeat superior. But
these decisions do constitute a substantial body of authority in lavor
of that position-a body of authority that was not addressed by the
Monell Court. Indeed, Monell, by finding all forms of vicarious liability inconsistent with section 1983, seems to require overturning
each of thege lines of cases-a result apparently not anticipated by
the Court. 74
At the same time, the Court failed to take into account its own
decisions construing section 1983 against the background of tort
law and reading into the statute a variety of common-law tort
principles.7 5 To be faithful to those cases, then, it is necessary to
conduct a fuller exploration of the statutory background and purposes.
It is true that most courts that have allowed municipal liability under Bivens have
nevertheless rejected respondeat superior. They have done so, however, for reasons relating
to the peculiar nature of the nonstatutory claim; their objections have no relevance to section
1983 actions. In Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (lst Cir. 1977), for example, Chief Judge Coffin
declined to infer a respondeat superior action from the Constitution because such a course
would require too great an exercise of judicial initiative, given the congressional hostility to
municipal liability evidenced in Monroe v. Pape.560 F.2d at 43-44. The court left open what
it would do if it were "faced with a case in which the municipality had ordered the constitutional violation," id. at 45.
In Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom.
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978) (for reconsideration in light of Monell),
the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion through a somewhat different analysis.
Turpin held respondeat superior inappropriate in a direct constitutional action against a
municipality because it considered Bivens to require a culpable defendant. Id. at 166. The
court also seemed to interpret Bivens as requiring the absence of any statutory cause of
action, id. at 166; since the plaintiff could have sued the individual wrongdoer under section
1983, a respondeat superior Bivens-type action was inappropriate. Other courts denying
respondeat superior liability in fourteenth amendment actions have done so for similar reasons. See, e.g., Jamison v. McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1977); McDonald v. Illinois,
557 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Dunlap v. City of Chicago,
435 F. Supp. 1295, 1301-03 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Several courts have, however, applied respondeat
superior in Bivens-type actions against municipalities. E.g., Santiago v. City of Philadelphia,
435 F. Supp. 136, 148-49 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Collum v. Yurkovich, 409 F. Supp. 557, 558-59
(N.D. fI1. 1975); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 160-61 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
While it has been suggested that the fourteenth amendment action will, even after
Monell, provide a vehicle for bringing suits against municipalities, see, e.g., 47 U. CIN. L. REv.
670, 676-77 (1979), courts apparently consider themselves bound by the congressional antipathy to respondeat superior perceived in Monell. See, e.g., Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454
F. Supp. 652, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
71 The first case to consider the impact of Monell on any of these lines of cases seems to
have been Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). There, the Fifth
Circuit found in a section 1983 action that a sheriff cannot be held vicariously liable under
state law applied through section 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), because "[aillowing Louisiana's vicarious liability rules to govern this case would be directly contrary to MoneUI's
construction of § 1983, and thus to the requirements of § 1988." Id. at 1208.
1- See text and notes at notes 21-25 supra.
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CASE FOR RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

The language of section 1983 does not itself define the contours
of municipal liability. A strong argument can be made, however,
that given Congress's purposes in enacting section 1983 and the
background of municipal tort liability in 1871, Congress intended to
impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities..
A.

The Reach of Section 1983

The Reconstruction Congress viewed section 1983 as a remedial
statute that should be liberally construed;7 6 the Supreme Court
has given the Civil Rights Acts "[a] sweep as broad as [their]
language.' ,,7 Thus, if respondeat superior liability advances
the congressional purposes underlying section 1983-deterrence
of and compensation for constitutional violations committed by
state and local officialsT-municipal liability for employee torts
arguably falls within the ambit of the statute."
71See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) ("All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and
beneficently construed."); id. at 800 (remarks of Rep. Perry) ("we have asserted as fully as
we can assert the mischief intended to be remedied . . . . We have also asserted as fully as
we can assert the constitutional right of Congress to legislate."); id. at app. 81 (remarks of
Rep. Bingham) (section 1983 is designed to secure "the enforcement. . . of the Constitution
on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic. . .to the extent of the rights guaranteed
to him by the Constitution"); cf. id. at app. 216-17 (remarks of Sen. Thurman) (criticizing
the statute's broad language because "[t]here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms
that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be used").
17 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (quoting United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
71See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) ("The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and
prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law."). See generally
Nahmod, supra note 24, at 9-11. The effectiveness of section 1983 in meeting these goals has,
however, been seriously brought into question by a recent study of section 1983 litigation
against police. See Project, Suing the Police In Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979).
79The use of respondeat superior in the municipal context as a means of encouraging
compensation and discouraging wrongdoing has been widely advocated by both courts and
commentators. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 216, 222-25 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Carter v.
Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365-67 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd in part on other grounds sul nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.
Supp. 136, 148-49 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sanabria v. Village of Monticello, 424 F. Supp. 402, 41011 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Hundt, Suing
Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 770, 779-82
(1975); Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972); Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers:Proposalsto Strengthen
the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 455-58
(1978); Note, A Federal Cause of Action Against a Municipality for Fourth Amendment
Violations by Its Agents, 42 GEO. WASH. L. Rv.850 (1974); Note, Accountability for Govern-
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1. Compensation. Section 1983's goal of compensating individuals for violations of their constitutional rights" will unquestionably be frustrated by the Court's refusal to impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities. First, as an evidentiary matter, it is
often impossible for the plaintiff to identify the individual responsible for the abuse, 81 although the victim can demonstrate that the
wrongdoer was a municipal employee. Further, by requiring the
plaintiff to show "municipal involvement" in order to satisfy
Monell's requirements, a difficult legal barrier is established.82 Finally, on a practical level, the employee-defendant is likely to be
either judgment proof or, as a municipal agent, viewed sympathetically by the jury."
ment Misconduct: Limiting QualifiedImmunity and the Good FaithDefense, 49 TEMP. L.Q.
938, 971-73 (1976). See also Comment, supra note 35.
" It is settled law that violations of constitutional rights may be compensable harms.
See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); Baskin v. Parker, 588 F.2d 965, 970
(5th Cir. 1979). See generally Nahmod, supra note 24. The Court has recently held, however,
that damages may be awarded only for actual harm. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264
(1978).
" See, e.g., Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 282-84 (3d Cir. 1972).
12 One district court required the plaintiff to demonstrate in his pleadings either the
details of municipal involvement in the violation or other instances of misconduct by a
municipal employee. The court hoped to avoid having municipalities named as defendants
in every civil rights suit, both to protect local governments from undue fiscal burdens and to
avoid unnecessarily long trials. Smith v. Ambroglio, 456 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978).
'3 See S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) ("Federal agents are usually judgment proof"); S. REP. No. 469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Percy) ("causes
of action against officials as individuals will, on occasion, be virtually worthless since government employees may be so lacking in funds as to be judgment proof"); Kates & Kouba, supra
note 79, at 136-37; Note, Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 6 IND. L. REv. 509, 515
(1973). In addition, most municipal employees lack insurance against damage judgments. See
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 26.1 (1956).
Many jurisdictions do indemnify public officers for job-related liabilities they incur.
Such indemnification, however, does not seem to further significantly the compensatory and
deterrence goals of section 1983:
If the officer is judgment proof, neither compensation nor substantial deterrence is likely
to result, even when the plaintiff wins. Ironically, those jurisdictions that provide indemnification for the police officer do little to make the lawsuit more effective. Actually,
where indemnification is available, the present system of suing only the individual
wrongdoer combines the worst of both worlds. The jurors, not informed of indemnification, think the officer will personally have to pay any damages awarded, so they tend to
find for defendants and, when damages are awarded, to keep the amount at a modest
level. Yet the defendant is not deterred from wrongdoing by the prospect of paying
damages, for he knows that any damage award will be covered by municipal indemnification.
Newman, supra note 79, at 456-57.
11See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Project, supra note 78, at 800-02. But see Molina
v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978) (concern over jury
sympathies is only speculative).
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Under a scheme of respondeat superior liability, these impediments to effectuating section 1983's goal of compensation are removed. The legal and evidentiary burden carried by the plaintiff is
reduced: while the victim must still establish that the violation is
of constitutional magnitude, he need only show in addition that the
individual wrongdoer was an employee of the municipality acting in
the course of his employment.8 5 And by imposing liability on the
municipality, respondeat superior ensures that damages will be
paid by a defendant with "deep pockets.""
2. Deterrence. The deterrence of constitutional violations
committed by those acting "under color of" state law would also be
aided by respondeat superior. The Court in Monroe v. Pape noted
that section 1983 was designed to deter potential wrongdoers by
providing victims with a federal forum for the enforcement of fourteenth amendment rights.17 Respondeat superior liability guarantees victims access to that forum even if the individual wrongdoer
is unavailable. Moreover, since the municipality-the employer of
the wrongdoer-must bear the costs of the violation, municipal officials are likely to take steps to deter city employees from committing constitutional torts. 8 Such a scheme would thus encourage the
establishment of more effective municipality-wide deterrence mechanisms than if liability were limited to a host of possibly unidentifiable or judgment-proof individual defendants. And the deterrent
effect of personal liability would not be lost, since individual wrongdoers would remain potentially liable under section 1983.89
" See note 5 supra.
8 See, e.g., Project, supra note 78, at 817. See also G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
21 (1970). The recent study of section 1983 litigation against police, Project, supra note 78,
recommended that "in order to make section 1983 suits more effective . . municipalities
should be made strictly liable for the unconstitutional acts of their police officers." Id. at 816.
The study concluded that "adoption of a standard of strict liability will ensure that damages
awarded to successful plaintiffs will be paid by 'deep pocket' defendants." Id. at 817. What
the study labels a scheme of strict liability seems to be one of respondeat superior. See id.
at 816 ("It is unfair and impractical to demand that before a municipality is held liable, the
plaintiff must show a causal link.").
,1 365 U.S. at 182-83. The Court has in several instances emphasized the importance of
providing a federal forum for constitutional claims: hostile state courts might thwart the
vindication of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-43 (1972);
Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 1352, 1356-60 (1970); Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977
Sup. CT. Rav. 193, 233-34; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
11 See Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REV.
209, 229-30 (1963); Kates & Kouba, supra note 79, at 140-41. See generally R. POSNER,
ECONoMIc ANALYsis OF LAw 119-59 (2d ed. 1977); Note, supra note 35, at 923-24.
" There is something to the argument that if the treasury pays, the deterrent effect of
the judgment on the police officer is dulled. But perhaps the weight of the argument as
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3. The "Fairness" of Respondeat Superior. The argument
can be made that it is unfair to impose liability on a municipality
that in many instances has "committed" no wrong other than that
of employing the individual wrongdoer. But the contention seems
to misapprehend the nature of municipal vicarious liability: not
only is the municipality acting through its agent when the violation
is committed, 0 it has clothed the employee with the governmental
authority necessary for a constitutional abuse to take place.'" Thus,
the constitutional violations committed by municipal employees
acting within the scope of their employment are costs of municipal
government that should properly be distributed among the local
citizenry. 2 Indeed, someone-the wrongdoer, his employer, or the
victim-must absorb the cost of the injury.13 When the wrongdoer
cannot be reached, it seems fair to shift the cost to the employer-in
this case, the community at large-because the municipality is in
the better position to prevent future constitutional violations. In
sum, where the choice is between imposing the loss on the victim
or imposing it on the municipality, the latter seems preferable.
B.

The Background of Municipal Tort Liability

The legislative purpose has not been the only guide used by the
courts in construing section 1983. Judicial interpretation of the statute has also traditionally been shaped by tort-law concepts." In
to deterrence is the other way. If recovery can be had only against the officer and he is
judgment-proof, deterrence is at a minimum. If a judgment is collected against the state,
the state may in outrageous cases have recourse against the officer either out of his funds
or in the form of discipline. Furthermore, police tactics are often institutional and
awards against the state may modify institutional practices.
Jaffe, supra note 88, at 229-30.
" See, e.g., text and note at note 29 supra.
uJ See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (section 1983 protects citizens against
the "'misuse of power . . . made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law' ") (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Carter
v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("When a tort is made possible only through
the abuse of power granted by the government, then the government should be held accountable for the abuse"), rev'd in part on othergrounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418 (1973); Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (respondeat superior
"imposes liability on the entity which hired the police officer and gave him the opportunity
to commit a constitutional violation").
92 It has been suggested that compensation for violations of rights that will unavoidably
be perpetrated by municipal officials might be considered a "background cost of citizenship."
Developments, supra note 35, at 1218. Accord, Note, supra note 35, at 957.
" "If municipalities are not held liable . . . the social and economic burden of police
misconduct is borne by the uncompensated victims. The cost does not disappear merely
because recovery is not allowed." Project, supra note 78, at 817 n.199.
" See text and note at note 21 supra.
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Monell however, the Court ignored the principles of municipal tort
liability that formed the background for section 1983. But if Congress in enacting the statute intended to impose liability on municipalities, it seems likely that the contours of that liability were
shaped by the law of the day. Perhaps the surest guide to congressional intent, then, is the basic shape of nineteenth-century tort
law.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, municipalities 5 in
most American jurisdictions were not absolutely immune from suit
in tort, as is commonly believed; 6 they were, rather, routinely held
liable for torts committed by their employees. 7 While the contours

"s
The discussion in text deals only with incorporated municipalities. Unincorporated
governmental units-"quasi-corporations"-probably were considered immune in this country from the beginning, Barnett, The Foundations of the DistinctionBetween Public and
Private Functionsin Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,
16 OR. L. REv. 250, 264 (1937), unless made liable by statute, see, e.g., Mower v. Inhabitants
of Leicester, 9 Mass. 237, 239-40 (1812); Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks & Canals on
Merrimack River, 7 Mass. 169 (1810). Much of the uncertainty regarding the scope of
nineteenth-century municipal immunity has its origin in confusion between quasicorporations and incorporated municipalities. See, e.g., Comment, Municipality's Common
Law Liability for Police Torts, 1973 WASH.U. L.Q. 908, 908 & n.5 (indicating that "[alt early
common law municipalities were not liable for torts committed by their employees," but
citing cases dealing with quasi-corporations). Many nineteenth-century courts were themselves aware of the misapplication of the quasi-corporation doctrine. See, e.g., Weightman
v. Corporation of Washington, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 39, 52-53 (1861).
11 Cf. Monell, 436 U.S. at 720-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("no state court had ever
held that municipal corporations were always liable in tort in precisely the same manner as
other persons").
97 Early nineteenth-century cases held municipalities liable for both public and private
activities. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Georgetown, 19 F. Cas. 1348 (C.C.D.C. 1819) (No. 11,437)
(municipality liable for damage caused by negligent street repairs); Hooe v. Alexandria, 12
F. Cas. 462 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 6,667) (municipality liable for conduct of street commissioner); Moore v. Mayor of Mobile, 1 Stew. 284 (Ala. 1828) (dictum) (municipality liable as
warehouseinan); Wallace v. City of Muscatine, 4 Greene 373 (Iowa 1854) (city liable for
damage caused by negligent construction of drainage system); Tallahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla.
19, 25 (1850) (municipality liable for trespass on the case); Walling v. Mayor of Shreveport,
5 La. Ann. 660 (1850) (city liable for negligent road construction); Baumgard v. Mayor
of New Orleans, 9 La. 119 (1836) (city liable in trespass for illegal seizure of property by
carriage inspection commissioner); Mayor of Baltimore v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160, 174 (1856)
(when municipality has statutory duty to prevent nuisances, "[a]s the duty is the same in
the corporation and the individual, so are the consequences the same for its disregard");
Thayer v. City of Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511, 515 (1837) (dictum) (Shaw, C.J.) ("That
an action sounding in tort, will lie against a corporation, though formerly doubted, seems
now too well settled to be questioned."); Baker v. City of Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 184
(1831) (dictum) (city may be liable for creating a public nuisance if it is negligent in damming
a creek and the plaintiff suffers special damage); Hutson v. Mayor of New York, 9 N.Y. 163
(1853) (city liable for personal injuries caused by failure to keep streets in good repair); Mayor
of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433, 439 (N.Y. 1845) ("Although it was once doubted whether
an action of trespass, or trover, or an action on the case for malfeasance would lie against a
corporation, it is now settled in England, as well as in this state that such an action may be
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of tort liability changed somewhat over the course of the century,
in 1871 courts in all but two American jurisdictions"' still held municipalities liable for torts committed by their employees in the
course of a wide variety of municipal activities-those categorized
as "proprietary" or "corporate."" And municipalities were almost
universally held liable for those activities under the principle of
respondeat superior.' °0 As Professor Dillon explained in his 1872
maintained against corporations as well as actions upon the case for nonfeasance."); Delmonico v. Mayor of New York, 1 Sand. 222, 225 (Super. Ct. N.Y. 1848) ("the corporation of the
city is liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence, unskillfulness or malfeasance of its
agents and contractors, engaged in the construction of its public works"); People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. 1836) (dictum) (individuals can sue municipalities for
tort injuries); Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73, 79 (1848) (Pearson, J.) ("In the United States the liability of corporations to actions of tort is well settled");
City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 96 (1854) ("We have again and again affirmed, that
the liability of corporations, private and municipal, are no less extensive; and that the
maxim, respondeat superior,properly applies to them, in the same manner, and to the same
extent, as in its application to the liabilities of private individuals."); Town Council of
Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio 229, 230 (1849) ("a municipal corporation is liable for an injury
resulting to the property of another, by an act strictly within its corporate powers, and without negligence or malice"); Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio 160, 162 (1840) ("corporations are liable like individuals, for injuries done, although the act was not beyond their
lawful powers"); Commissioners of Kensington v. Wood, 10 Pa. 93, 95-96 (1848) ("It cannot
be controverted, that the [municipality is] liable for any injury arising from the unskilful,
improper, insufficient, and inartful manner in which the work is done."); Cole v. Corporation
of Nashville, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 162, 164, 166 (1856) (municipality liable for granting apothecary's license to a known "lunatic and insane" person who caused an explosion injuring the
plaintiff); Batty v. Town of Duxbury, 24 Vt. 155 (1852) (town primarily liable for injuries
caused by obstruction to public highway created by negligence of railroad company and not
corrected by the town). But see Monell, 436 U.S. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
no nineteenth-century authority).
1 See Dunbar v. Alcalde of San Francisco, 1 Cal. 355 (1850) (court, apparently confusing
liability rules governing quasi-corporations, see note 95 supra, with those governing actual
corporations, found no common-law municipal liability); White v. City Council of Charleston, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 571, 574 (1835) (same). See also Barnett, supra note 95, at 261.
" In 1842, the distinction between "public" and "private" corporate functions was made,
in dicta, in a widely followed New York case, Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (Super.
Ct. N.Y. 1842), affl'd, 2 Denio 433 (N.Y. 1845). By 1871, the private-public distinction had
become accepted doctrine. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TORTS 619-27 (1880);
J. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 766, at 723 (1872). The origin
of the distinction may lie, in part, in the confusion between nonliable unincorporated governmental units and fully liable municipal corporations. See Barnett, supra note 95, at 266. In
some jurisdictions, however, municipalities may have still been held liable for governmental
actions in 1871; Arkansas, for example, seems to have adopted the governmental-proprietary
distinction in 1872. City of Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572, 576 (1872).
11 See, e.g., Weightman v. Corporation of Washington, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 39, 49 (1861)
(court not convinced by argument that municipal corporations "are not responsible for the
nonfeasances or misfeasances of the persons necessarily employed by them"); Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 F. Cas. 462 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 6,667); Johnson v. Municipality No. One, 5 La.
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Ann. 100, 100 (1850) (reprinting lower court opinion) ("The liability of municipal corporations for the acts of their agent is, as a general rule, too well settled at this day to be seriously questioned."); Baumgard v. Mayor of New Orleans, 9 La. 119 (1836); Anthony v.
Inhabitants of Adams, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 284, 285 (1840) (Shaw, C.J.) (dictum) ("the...
employer shall be answerable civiliter for the mismanagement and negligence of the agent
employed by him"); Thayer v. City of Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511 (1837) (dictum); City
of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, 183-84 (1861) (when city had obligation to barricade sewer
excavation, contractors who acted "as agents of the city" made it liable under respondeat
superior); Requa v. City of Rochester, 45 N.Y. 129, 136 (1871) (city liable for failure to
remedy defect in street because of the negligence of "agents charged with that duty");
Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N.Y. 164, 200 (1865) (dictum) ("public corporations
[are] responsible on account of their legal personality, and their capacity for suing and
being sued, for the negligent acts of their agents and servants in the execution of their
duties"); Delmonico v. Mayor of New York, 1 Sand. 222 (Super. Ct. N.Y. 1848); Meares v.
Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73, 79 (Pearson, J.) ("the defendants as a
corporation . . . are liable for the damage done by their agent, under the rule respondeat
superior"); City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80, 96 (1854) ("We have again and again
affirmed, that the liabilities of corporations, private and municipal, are no less extensive;
and that the maxim, respondeat superior,properly applies to them, in the same manner,
and to the same extent, as in its application to the liabilities of private individuals.");
Goodloe v. City of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500 (1831); Cole v. Corporation of Nashville, 36 Tenn.
(4 Sneed) 162, 166 (1856) ("The general doctrine is now well established, both in England
and this country, that corporations are liable for the wrongful acts and neglect of their
officers and agents!'). Cf. Boyland v. Mayor of New York, 1 Sand. 27, 30 (Super. Ct. N.Y.
1847) (holding city not liable for gunshot wounds sustained at a public meeting because
"[t)he relation of master and servant, or principal and agent, did not exist here, between
the corporation, and the person who fired the cannon").
A number of nineteenth-century municipal cases appear, on first glance, to reject respondeat superior. Most of these, however, do not actually reject the view that a municipality is
liable for the acts of its employees; rather, they give a narrow interpretation to the doctrine
of respondeat superior itself. The reason is that the scope of respondeat superior liability, as
applied to both private and municipal corporations, changed somewhat over the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: employers were at first not held liable for intentional
or unlawful actions committed by their employees, even if those actions were undertaken for
the benefit of the employer. See, e.g., Prather v. City of Lexington, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 559,
560 (1852) (dictum) (a municipality is "not responsible for the unauthorized and unlawful
acts of its officers, although done under color of their office.

.

.

. [Ilt must appear.

. .

that

they were done in pursuance of a general authority to act for the corporation"); Fox v.
Northern Liberties, 3 Watts & Serg. 103, 106 (Pa. 1841) (Where municipal officer seized
plaintiff's property wrongfully claiming that plaintiff had violated city ordinances, "it cannot
be said that the officer acts under any authority given to him .

. .

. It is like the familiar

case of master and servant, where the latter wilfully does an act without the consent or
authority of the master, by which a third person is injured, the servant alone is answerable.").
But these cases did not require that the employer expressly authorize the tort; rather, the
action must have been "done bona fide in pursuance of a general authority to act for the city,"
Thayer v. City of Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511, 517. (1837). These cases thus took a
restrictive view of the "scope of employment" requirement, see note 5 supra. This was not,
however, the general view even at the beginning of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Hooe v.
Alexandria, 12 F. Cas. 462 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 6,667) (municipality liable for an employee's
wrongs "if he was acting under their authority. . . although he may have acted without their
orders, or contrary to them"); Goodloe v. City of Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500, 513-14 (1831)
("Whatever may have been the ancient doctrines, with regard to the liability of corporations,
for wrongs done by their agents, courts have gradually departed from them. . . . There is
no justice in sending [the plaintiff] to seek redress from an irresponsible agent"). Indeed,
beginning in the eighteenth century, courts found a theory of respondeat superior that made
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treatise on municipal corporations, "[w]hen it is sought to render
a municipal corporation liable for the acts of a servant or agents, a
cardinalinquiry is, whether they are servants or agents of the corporation."0 If the employee's acts "relate to the exercise of corporate
powers, and are for the peculiar benefit of the corporation in its local
or special interest, [the employees] may justly be regarded as its
the master liable only for acts commanded by him "far too narrow to meet the expanding
complications of commerce and industry," and they therefore began to impose the broader
liability rule prevalent today. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 69, at 458-59. Accord,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 219, Comment a, at 483.
Other nineteenth-century cases offer a host of obscure doctrines for finding municipalities immune from liability for the acts of their employees, but none of these present a
principled rejection of respondeat superior. Some cases, for example, indicate that municipalities cannot be made liable for the discretionary wrongdoing of their agents. See, e.g., Mayor
of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433, 450 (N.Y. 1845) (dictum) (opinion of A. Hand, Senator)
("a municipal corporation [is] not liable for acts requiring the exercise of discretion when
those acts are for the benefit of the public"); Haynes v. Town of Burlington, 38 Vt. 350, 361
(1865) (dictum) ("We are not prepared to hold that . . . officers in the performance of
their official duty, do sustain to the town the ordinary relation of private agents to a principal"). But these cases seem merely to refer to the corporate-governmental distinction-a
distinction that has no implications for respondeat superior. See text and notes at notes 103105 infra.
Some cases indicate that public officers should not be held liable for the acts of persons
they are obliged to employ in order to discharge a public duty. See, e.g., Bailey v. Mayor of
New York, 3 Hill 531, 538 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1842), affl'd, 2 Denio 433 (N.Y. 1845). Supervisory
officials, however, are never liable for the acts of their subordinates under respondeat superior. See text and note at note 66 supra.
Finally, at least one case suggested that municipalities could only be liable when negligent in carrying out a legal duty to maintain a public work; according to the court it was
only in this type of case that the servant had no discretion. Elliott v. City of Philadelphia,
75 Pa. 347, 349-50 (1874) (reprinting lower court opinion). While it is true that many
nineteenth-century cases dealing with municipalities involve negligence relating to public
works, or failure to perform a legal duty-perhaps because nineteenth-century municipalities
had relatively few employees and were therefore subjected to fewer suits based upon a respondeat superior theory, or because the construction and maintenance of public works was the
most common form of "corporate" activity-Elliott appears to misstate the law. A substantial number of nineteenth-century cases did hold municipalities liable for the general torts
of their employees. See, e.g., Baumgard v. Mayor of New Orleans, 9 La. 119 (1836); Cole v.
Corporation of Nashville, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 162 (1856). And the cases explicitly recognized
that municipalities could be made liable for the acts of agents committed in the course of
their regular duties as well as for negligence in the construction of public works. See, e.g.,
Prather v. City of Lexington, 52 Ky. (13 B. Mon.) 559, 560-61 (1852) (dictum). The Elliott
court may have been confused by the ultra vires doctrine, which protected municipalities
from liability for actions taken outside "the general powers of the corporation." C. ELLiOTT,
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF PUBLIC CORPORA7rONS § 302, at 271 (1898). Cf. Mayor of Albany

v. Cunliff, 2 N.Y. 165 (1849) (where city lacked authority to construct a bridge because the
enabling legislation was not passed by a two-thirds majority, the city would not be liable
for negligent construction).
M'J. DILLON, supranote 99, § 772, at 730 (emphasis in original).
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agents or servants, and the maxim of respondeat superior applies."10 2

It is true that in 1871 municipalities enjoyed a limited protection from liability for the torts of their employees. This protection
was based on the fiction that there is a distinction between the
municipality's corporate actions-for which it was liable-and its
"public" or "governmental" activities-for which it was not. But
this was not seen as an immunity as such; rather, as Dillon explained, municipal agents who engaged in governmental activities
were "not to be regarded as the servants or agents of the corporation

. . .

but as public or state officers." 1

3

The rationale was that

the delivery of "public" services, such as police protection, was
the duty of the state. The municipality was immune, then, not
because the principle of respondeat superior was abandoned in some
areas, but because, under the private-public distinction, the agent
was seen as the employee of the state rather than of the municipality."0 4 The municipality merely supervised the employee on behalf
of the state, and as a supervisor was not liable under respondeat
superior;"' the state presumably would have been liable had it not
been protected by sovereign immunity.
Respondeat superior liability for municipalities was therefore
the rule and not the exception when Congress enacted section 1983;
insofar as municipalities were liable, it was under that principle.
And the theory that governed municipal liability was considered
identical to the one that controlled the liability of private corporations.1 Thus, if Congress intended to impose liability on municipal
102Id. (emphasis in original). And the doctrine was applied to municipalities precisely
as it was applied to other corporate bodies. T. COOLEY, supra note 99, at 122. Accord, C.
ELLoTr,supranote 100, § 301, at 269; D. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE NEGUGENCE OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORTIONS § 161, at 312-13 (1892). But see E. JAGGARD, supranote 66 at 173, 181 (while a
municipality is liable for the proprietary acts of its agents, it is not liable unless it has
authorized or ratified them).
3 J. DILLON, supra note 99, § 772, at 730.
"I For example, firemen and police officers were considered officers of the state rather
than of the municipality. See id. §§ 773-774, at 732-34.
" See note 66 supra.
' See, e.g., Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 F. Cas. 462 (C.C.D.C. 1802) (No. 6,667) (municipality treated like private corporation); Moore v. Mayor of Mobile, 1 Stew. 284 (Ala. 1828) (dictum) (municipality liable as a warehouseman); McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland 407, 417, 419 (Md.
Ch. 1828) (dictum) ("The right and capacity to sue and be sued, is an incident to bodies
politic of all descriptions," including those which "relate merely to the public police" which
are "the auxiliaries of the government in the great business of municipal rule"); Thayer v.
City of Boston, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511, 516 (1837) ("there seems no sufficient ground for a
distinction in this respect [liability], between cities and towns and other corporations");
Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433 (N.Y. 1845) (municipality treated like private
corporation); Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73, 80 (1848) (court
responded to municipality's attempt to distinguish municipal and private corporations by
noting that "[this distinction . . . appears at the first suggestion to be plausible, but will
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corporations under the statute, as the Monell Court held, it is likely
that such liability was seen as following the only model of municipal
liability with which most legislators were familiar-respondeat superior. It has been said that if Congress had intended to create
municipal liability under section 1983, that intention would have
been reflected in the legislative debates."'7 It seems more accurate
to say that had Congress intended to change the law by eliminating
municipal respondeat superior, that intention would have been
clearly reflected in the legislative history.
It can be argued, of course, that the distinction between public
and private acts should continue to be applied in suits against municipalities. Municipalities would then be held liable only for the
acts of those who, in 1871, would have been considered municipal
rather than state employees. Such an approach should, however, be
rejected. The common law of 1871 undoubtedly sheds light on
whether Congress contemplated respondeat superior liability in
enacting section 1983. But in a series of recent cases dealing with
immunities under that statute, the Supreme Court has indicated
that when construing section 1983, both the statutory purpose and
developments in the common law since 1871 must be considered in
addition to the tort-law background against which Congress was
legislating. ' " Most importantly, the Court has indicated that an
interpretation that would defeat the statutory purpose cannot
stand.
Adoption of the private-public fiction would frustrate both of
the goals of section 1983-the compensation of victims and the deterrence of official misconduct. 9 By creating immunity for certain
municipal actions labeled "public," a vacuum would be created in
areas in which section 1983's remedial effect is most often needed.
Police services,
for example, were traditionally considered to be
"public,"110 but there is a tremendous potential for the abuse of
policy authority-and it was the abuse of official authority that
prompted the enactment of section 1983.111
not bear examination, and is more fanciful than real"); City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St.
80, 95 (1854) ("we have again and again affirmed, that the liabilities of corporations, private
and municipal, are no less extensive"); McCombs v. Town Council of Akron, 15 Ohio 474
(1846) (muncipality treated like private corporation); Rhodes v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio
159 (1840) (same); Barnett, supra note 95, at 259.
IU Monell, 436 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
''
E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
'" See text and notes at notes 80-89 supra.
, See note 104 supra.
m See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of § 1983

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:935

At the same time, the private-public distinction has never produced a coherent body of case law, and most commentators have
concluded that it is impossible to reach principled decisions on the
basis of the distinction.112 Many jurisdictions have therefore moved
away from its use." 3 This, too, counsels against adoption of the
distinction in section 1983 cases.
Both of the traditional sources of authority to which the courts
have looked in construing section 1983 thus support the imposition
of respondeat superior liability on municipalities. In the absence of
any persuasive countervailing argument, then, it seems that respondeat superior should be applied to municipalities to vindicate constitutional rights effectively and to fulfill the congressional intent.
"[I. FEDERALISM

The Monell Court did not indicate that principles of federalism
militate against section 1983 municipal liability. But in several recent cases, 14 most notably NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, " the
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights"); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 148-49 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (section 1983 "is intended by its terms to protect individual rights from abuse by
municipalities and other repositories of state power") (footnote omitted).
112 See, e.g., W. PRossER, supra note 5, § 131, at 979; Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort (pt. 2), 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924) ("In few, if any, branches of the law have the courts

labored more abjectly under the supposed inexorable domination of formulas, phrases and
terminology, with the result that facts have often been tortured into the framework of a
formula, lacking in many cases any sound basis of reason or policy.").
M See, e.g., Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Scruggs v.
Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1967); Arnolt v. City of Highland Park, 52
Ill. 2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144 (1972); Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309, 226 N.E.2d 597
(1967). See also 18 F. McQuu.uN, MUNIcPA

CORPOA7rONS § 53.02 (3d ed. 1977); Bermann,

IntegratingGovernmentaland Officer Tort Liability, 77 CoLUM. L. Rav. 1175, 1175-78 (1977);
Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. Rav. 41 (1949); 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 624, 628-29
(1976). The federal government has also waived sovereign immunity in this area, and recently
permitted liability for certain intentional torts of its employees. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
"4 E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 927-28 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
'is
426 U.S. 833 (1976). The decision has provoked extensive commentary. See, e.g.,
Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment?, 1976
SUP. CT. REv. 161; Kilberg & Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Meaning and
Impact, 45 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.613 (1977); Schwartz, National League of Cities v. UseryThe Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1115 (1978);
Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative Rights to
EssentialGovernment Services, 90 HRv.L. REv. 1065 (1977); Note, Toward New Safeguards
on Conditional Spending: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 Am.U.L.
Rav. 726 (1977); Comment, Constitutional Law-Commerce Power Limited to Preserve
States'Rolein the FederalSystem, 30 RuTGS L. Rav. 152 (1976); 57 B.U. L. REv. 178 (1977).
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Court has given new life to the concept of federalism" 6-a principle
that guarantees the "'separate and independent existence'" of the
states 17 and local governments. 18 The 'adoption of respondeat superior liability under section 1983 would likely increase the number of
federal suits initiated and successfully prosecuted against municipalities. Such a liability scheme would affect the independence of
local governments both by placing demands on municipal treasuries
and by influencing local hiring and supervisory decisions. Given this
impact on local sovereignty, respondeat superior liability for municipalities under section 1983 is arguably either unconstitutional or,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, unintended.
A.

The Constitutionality of Respondeat Superior. Liability

While the Constitution contains few explicit guarantees of state
sovereignty,"' it plainly assumes the existence of the states as independent entities, which are to be "left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways.' 12 Further, the tenth amendment
has been interpreted to mean that "Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity, or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system.' 2' It is therefore possible
to view the imposition of respondeat superior liability, although
within an enumerated congressional power, as beyond congressional
authority because it would damage the "separate and independent
existence" of the states. Such an analysis would rely on National
League, in which the Court ruled that provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),' 2 though "undoubtedly within the scope of

"

See generally Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Cox, Federalism and Individual
Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1978); Lay, States' Rights: The Emergence of New JudicialPerspective, 22 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1977); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist:
A PreliminaryView, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 293, 315-22 (1976); Note, MunicipalBankruptcy, the
Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HAnv. L. Rv.1871 (1976).
"7 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
' The eleventh amendment protects the states-albeit not absolutely-from suits in
federal courts. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. But the amendment has been held not to reach
political subdivisions of the states. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
Further, Congress can abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity of the state when implementing the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other SovereignImmunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203, 1232 & n.143 (1978).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
2 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
12229 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). The Act originally excluded government employees
from its provisions; the legislation at issue in National League was a 1974 amendment, see
29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (x) (1976).
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the commerce clause,"'2 must be held void as inconsistent with
state sovereignty. "If Congress may withdraw from the States the
authority to make. . . fundamental employment decisions," wrote
Justice Rehnquist for the Court, "we think there would be little left
of the States' 'separate and independent existence.' "1124 Justice
Rehnquist thus drew upon the dual-sovereignty tradition enunciated in cases such as Collector v. Day.12
The simplest answer to this argument is that congressional authority for enacting section 1983 is drawn from the fourteenth
amendment, which explicitly limits state power and has long been
interpreted as granting to Congress unique authority vis-a-vis the
states. In Ex parte Virginia,12 1 the Court found that the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments "were intended to be, what they really
are, limitations on the power of the States, and enlargements of the
power of Congress." 1 27 Thus the Court concluded that in cases
"embraced within the fourteenth amendment," congressional
power is "complete," 1 2 and thereafter the Court has consistently
held that when enforcing the amendment's guarantees Congress
can overcome what would otherwise be compelling state interests." 9
Indeed, the NationalLeague Court expressly left open the question
whether it would have struck down the FLSA amendments had
Congress been acting under the fourteenth amendment rather than
13 0
the commerce clause.
The most recent indication of the unique power of Congress in
enforcing the substantive guarantees of the fourteenth amendment
is in Monell itself, where the Court flatly declared that National
League is "irrelevant" to the consideration of a case involving "'a
federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlaw426 U.S. at 841.
,5 Id. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
"
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). See text and notes at notes 44-48 supra.
126 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
"2

127Id.

at 345.

Id. at 348.
'2' See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).'In Fitzpatrick,Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, noted-although in the context of the eleventh amendment-that
12

"Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Id. at 456 (footnote
omitted)..
"1 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The lower federal courts have relied upon the Court's footnote
to validate congressional action in other areas. See, e.g., Marshall v. Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1
(7th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery
v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Kilberg & Fort,
supra note 115.
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ful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.' """: Just

such conduct would be involved in a section 1983 suit based on
respondeat superior against a municipality. A full application of
section 1983 would therefore not overstep congressional authority
under the Constitution.
B. The Clear-Statement Rule
Granted the requisite congressional power, a more plausible
argument against respondeat superior may be based on the limits
of federal judicial authority. One approach to reconciling federalism
concerns with congressional authority in this area is to find that, as
a matter of statutory construction, considerations of federalism support an interpretation of section 1983 that does not comprehend
municipal respondeat superior liability. The analysis used in this
approach is usually formulated as a canon of construction-frequently referred to as the "clear-statement rule"132-that
requires ambiguous federal statutes to be interpreted narrowly to
avoid impinging upon state sovereignty. While the Supreme Court
has not tied the rule to a particular constitutional provision, it apparently draws on both the tenth 33 and eleventh'34 amendments.
The aim of this approach is to ensure that Congress intended its
actions to have an impact on the federal-state balance, and to prevent the courts from usurping Congress's functions. 3 5 The potential
application of this analysis to the problem here is obvious: since
"1436
132See,

U.S. at 690 n.54 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)).
e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("unless Congress conveys

its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance") (footnote omitted).
I" See L. TRine, AMERIcAN CoNsTrrrioNAL LAw 141-42 (1978) (in light of the tenth
amendment's guarantee of an effective federal system, "the Supreme Court should not lightly
infer serious congressional inroads upon state autonomy"). In extreme cases, where the con-

gressional action will interfere directly with vital state functions, even an absolutely clear
statement of congressional purpose will not validate the congressional action. See National
League, 426 U.S. at 851-52; Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).

The force of the tenth amendment "prong" of the clear-statement analysis is, however,
put in some doubt hy City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978),
in which Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, indicated that NationalLeague
creates no "presumption" in favor of municipalities. Id. at 412 n.42; see text and notes at

notes 149-152 infra.
Im See L. TRImE, supra note 133, at 139-41, 140 & n.8. This prong of the clear-statement

analysis views the eleventh amendment as -conferring on the states rights against the federal
judiciary, rather than rights against Congress. Thus, the clear-statement rule prevents the
courts from developing their own remedies against the states, and as a result is "an appropriate and useful approach to reconciling national power with state litigational immunity." Id.
at 141 (footnote omitted).
133 See id. at 139-43.
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section 1983 makes no mention of respondeat superior, perhaps the
section should not be read to impose such liability on municipalities. On closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that both the constitutional underpinnings of the clear-statement rule and congressional
intent in enacting section 1983 make the approach inapplicable in
this context.
The clear-statement rule has not been accorded equal weight
in all situations. The Court has insisted that any congressional intent to impinge upon the state litigational immunity conferred by
the eleventh amendment be explicit. But it has given the rule less
force when considering other statutes that change the federal-state
balance in more subtle ways, thereby arguably coming into conflict
with the tenth amendment or the guarantees of state sovereignty
implicit in the Constitution. Thus, "the more onerous the restriction
on state options represented"'3 'by the federal action, the clearer the
expression of congressional intent must be. As a result, the clearstatement rule appears to embody a "two-tier" test: one for eleventh
amendment cases and one for cases in which more general federalism principles are implicated.
When the statute in question will abrogate eleventh amendment protection, the rule is not easily satisfied. Thus, in Quern v.
3 7 the Court relied on the clear-statement rule to find
Jordan,'
states
excluded from the coverage of section 1983. There, Justice Rehnquist indicated that either express statutory language or a legislative "history focusing directly on the question of state liability"'3
is necessary to overcome the "constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States,"'' and the Monell holding was distinguished as applying only to nonimmune entities.' The rationale
for this stem test is "the importance of the States' traditional sovereign immunity";'" that this version of the rule does not include
municipalities is shown by Quern's treatment of Monell.
A stronger case, however, can be made for the application here
of the "second tier" of the clear-statement analysis. The Supreme
Court has indicated that general federalism principles should be
Id. at 142.
99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
,' Id. at 1147.
'9 Id. at 1146 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
,' Id. at 1144 ("This Court's holding in Monell was 'limited to local governmental units
which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes' ") (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54).
"' 99 S. Ct. at 1146.
'
"
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seen as protecting local as well as state governments.1 2 And the
second tier' of the clear-statement rule has been invoked outside
of the eleventh amendment context whenever the statute would
"significantly [change] the federal-state balance."' 44 Since imposing respondeat superior liability on municipalities could change
that balance, the analysis is aguably relevant even when political
subdivisions of the states are involved.' Yet two factors militate
against the use of the clear-statement analysis in the instant context. First, concerns over federalism are -mitigated here because the
usual presumption in favor of state and local sovereignty is weak
with respect to section 1983. The Civil Rights Act of 1871-from
which section 1983 derives-is a unique statute in which Congress,
under the authority of the fourteenth amendment, consciously altered the federal-state relationsip in favor of federal power.'" Under
the Act, the federal courts were interposed "between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights."'4 7 Given
Monell's holding that section 1983 applies to municipalities,
construing the provision narrowly so as to avoid injury to local sovereignty seems particularly inappropriate.
4I See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20 (1976). But see
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170 & n.20 (1977).
1,3 Quern demonstrates that a lesser showing of congressional intent is sufficient when
eleventh amendment abrogation is not involved. There the Court indicated that congressional
authorization must be apparent before h statute is said to make states amenable to suit. 99
S. Ct. at 1145. No such finding was made in Monell, although the same general legislative
history was considered in both Monell and Quern; in Monell it convinced the Court to find
municipalities liable, while in Quern the Court declared itself "unwilling to believe. . . that
Congress intended by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign
immunity of the States." 99 S. Ct. at 1145. Similarly, in Monell the Court was unconvinced
by Justice Rehnquist's argument that Congress would have explicitly discussed the question
of municipal liability had it wished to hold cities liable, see 436 U.S. at 718-24 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); in Quern, that argument was a "significant" prop in the majority's reasoning.
99 S. Ct. at 1146.
" United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (footnote omitted). Accord, United
States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,'
351 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1956); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449-50
(1953); FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1939).
I For example, what would previously have been a state tort suit against a municipality
might become a federal action, so that federal courts would take jurisdiction over what had
been an area of the law traditionally reserved to the states. The clear-statement analysis has
been applied in an analogous context-rendering an expansive reading to a statute that would
federalize what had been state criminal jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336 (1971); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
'" See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
"' Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
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Second, the clear-statement approach has never been given fill
force in favor of municipalities.' The reasons for this were articulated in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., "I in
which the Court considered whether municipalities should be subject to the antitrust laws. 50 There, Justice Brennan, writing for a
plurality of the Court, stated that "[c]ities are not themselves
sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States
that create them."' 151 Then, apparently addressing the clearstatement rule, Justice Brennan wrote: "we search in vain for anything in [National League] that establishes a constructional principle of presumptive congressional deference in behalf of cities."' ' 52
The municipalities were therefore held liable under the antitrust
laws, except insofar as their activities were directed-by the state.
Finally, even if the clear-statement rule applied in full to section 1983 suits against municipalities, it would not seem to compel
the rejection of respondeat superior liability for local governments.
The Supreme Court has indicated that for cases imwhich eleventh
amendment concerns are not present, an explicit statement of congressional intent to affect the federal-state balance is not necessary. 153 In these second-tier cases, the clear-statement rule seems to
"I No cases have been found dealing with the exercise of federal power against municipalities in which the Supreme Court invoked the clear-statement rule.
9 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
110At issue was the scope of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), in which the Court
held that states could engage in anticompetitive activities as an act of government. Complicating the decision in Lafayette, however, was the fact that a municipality had already been
held to be a "person" under section eight of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976), for the
purpose of bringing suit as a plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws, Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). The Lafayette inquiry thus parallelled that in
Parker, in which the Court held states exempt from antitrust regulation though they, too,
could bring suit under the antitrust laws.
151435 U.S. at 412.
352 Id. at 412 n.42. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on cases holding
that municipalities are unprotected by the eleventh amendment. Id. Justice Stewart, in
dissent, labeled those cases "basically irrelevant," id. at 431 (Stewart, J., dissenting); he
argued instead that National League, in holding that municipalities were protected by federalism principles, had established that "states and their political subdivisions must be given
equal deference." Id. at 430. But eleventh amendment jurisprudence may be relevant here.
The plurality appears to argue that deference is due the states only because they are
"sovereign." Thus, the clear-statement approach is used because, under "our 'dual system
of government . . . the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority.'" Id. at 412 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351
(1943)). That is the reason "a congressional purpose to ... control the States' acts of government will not lightly be inferred." Id. Since municipalities are not, even under National
League, considered sovereign, following the approach of the City of Lafayette plurality would
mean that the clear-statement rule should never be invoked in favor of municipalities, except
insofar as they are acting at the behest of the state.
"I These cases therefore differ from eleventh amendment suits like Quern, in which the
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be merely a canon of construction to be applied when the usual
methods of statutory interpretation do not reveal the congressional
intent. In Monell, for example, the Court made the threshold determination that municipalities are covered by section 1983, though
there was no suggestion in the opinion that the legislative debates
focused on the statute's applicability to municipalities; indeed, as
Justice Rehnquist's Monell dissent makes clear, the debates did not
directly touch on the question of municipal liability at all.' Nonetheless, the majority and dissent made no mention of the clearstatement rule.
Applying the clear-statement analysis as so formulated to the
question of section 1983 municipal liability seems to permit the
imposition of respondeat superior. For the common understanding
of the scope of municipal liability at the time the statute was enacted, 51 combined with Congress's intention that the provision be
accorded the broadest possible remedial application, 6 make it
Court insisted on an explicit consideration of state liability in the statutory language or

legislative history. 99 S. Ct. at 1139, 1146. Outside the eleventh amendment context, the
Court has not considered the rule determinative; it has imposed liability on municipalities
without mentioning the clear-statement rule-as' it did in Monell-so long as the legislative
intent can be derived from the statutory background and purposes. And even in those
cases in which the Court has invoked the rule, it has liberally considered both the language
and the legislative history-and found that both were either ambiguous or actually favored
a narrow interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401 (1973) ("The
legislative framework" dispels statutory ambiguity); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
339, 346-47 (1971) (statutory language "does not read well under either view" and legislative
history is "inconclusive"); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) ("neither statutory language nor legislative history" supports a broad statutory qonstruction); Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940) (an interpretation of the Sherman Act resulting from
a broad statutory construction was "plainly not intended"); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308
U.S. 79, 86 (1939) (the "historic background.

. .

considerations governing Congress.

.

. and

the scheme of the legislation" all militated against a broad statutory interpretation). These
cases imply that the clear-statement rule should not be applied so long as the legislative
intent can be ascertained-even if that intent is not expressed explicitly.
Similarly, the Court has indicated that the clear-statement rule should not be invoked
when doing so would defeat the statutory purpose. See, e.g., FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312
U.S. 349, 351 (1941) (courts should not read into section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act anything "beyond the obvious meaning of language unless otherwise the purpose of the
Act would be defeated") (citation omitted). In the context of suits against municipalities,
the purposes of section 1983 can be achieved most effectively through respondeat superior.
See text and notes at notes 80-89 supra.
In a series of lower court cases, courts have considered the impact of federalism principles
on direct constitutional Bivens-type actions against municipalities and have indicated that
the clear-statement rule establishes a presumption against judicial activism in the absence
of any congressional guidance. See, e.g., Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 852-53 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 44 n.6 (1st Cir. 1977).
'" 436 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'5 See text and notes at notes 95-106 supra.
256 See text and notes at notes 76-77 supra.
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"difficult to conceive of Congress declining to hold cities to a com'5 7
monplace rule of law such as the rule of respondeat superior."'
CONCLUSION

The Monell Court rejected respondeat superior because of the
language and legislative history of section 1983. But its restrictive
reading of the statutory language runs counter to the traditionally
broad construction accorded the Civil Rights Acts. And by relying
on the rejection of the Sherman amendment, the Court simply repeated the mistake for which it rightly condemned the decision in
Monroe v. Pape. At the same time, the Court disregarded those
factors traditionally used in the interpretation of section 1983: the
statutory purpose and the background of nineteenth-century tort
law.
The Monell decision markedly increased the number of cases
that can be brought under section 1983; the Court may have hoped
to modify the decision's impact by adding a bar to respondeat superior. By doing so, however, the Court-in one of the most significant
civil rights decisions of the decade-threw into confusion both the
ultimate purposes of the statute and the proper methods of statutory interpretation. Before the Monell dictum becomes the basis for
future decisions, the Court should reconsider the issue with an eye
toward maintaining consistency in this area of the law.
Charles A. Rothfeld
117Levin, supra note 13, at 1535.

